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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
FRANKLIN BUTLER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This appeal is from a jury verdict finding the Appellant 
guilty of one count of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony in 
violation of U.C.A. § 76-6-302; and one count of aggravated 
kidnapping, a first degree felony in violation of U.C.A. § 76-5-
302. The Defendant was found guilty of the above charges, after a 
non-jury trial before the Honorable Michael J. Glasmann, Judge of 
the Second Judicial District, on the 26th day of July, 1995. 
Hearsay statements of a co-defendant were improperly admitted 
into evidence under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay 
rule found in Rule 801(d)2(E) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, when 
the trial court failed to sufficiently establish that a conspiracy 
existed. 
Jurisdiction to hear this case was conferred upon the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
§ 78-2-2 (3) (i) (1953, as amended) and Rule 26 of the Utah Rules 
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of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court exercised its authority 
and poured the case over to the Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court commit reversible error when it 
allowed hearsay statements of a co-defendant into evidence when it 
failed to sufficiently establish that a co-conspiracy existed? 
Standard of Review The proper standard of review to be 
applied to a trial court determination of whether a specific set of 
facts gives rise to reasonable suspicion is a determination of law 
and is reviewable nondeferentially for correctness, as opposed to 
being a fact determination reviewable for clear error. State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (S.Ct. 1994) 
CITATION TO THE RECORD PRESERVING ISSUES FOR APPEAL 
The Defendant's trial attorney properly objected to the 
statements made by the co-defendant and based those objections on 
the grounds of hearsay. (R. 22-26) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-4-20 - Conspiracy 
For purposes of this part a person is guilty of 
conspiracy when he, intending that conduct constituting 
a crime be performed, agrees with one or more persons to 
engage in or cause the performance of such conduct and 
any one of them commits an overt act in pursuance of the 
conspiracy, except where the offense is a capital 
offense, a felony against the person, arson, burglary, or 
robbery, the overt act is not required for the commission 
of conspiracy. 
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Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-302 - Aggravated kidnaping 
[Effective until April 29, 1996] 
(1) A person commits aggravated kidnaping if the person 
intentionally or knowingly, without authority of law and 
against the will of the victim, by any means and in any 
manner, seizes, confines, detains, or transports the victim 
with intent: 
(a) to hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield or 
hostage, or to compel a third person to engage in 
particular conduct or to forbear from engaging in 
particular conduct; or 
(b) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, 
or flight after commission or attempted commission of a 
felony; or 
(c) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the 
victim or another; or 
(d) to interfere with the performance of any 
governmental or political function; or 
(e) to commit a sexual offense as described in Part 4 of 
this chapter. 
(2) A detention or moving is deemed to be the result of 
force, threat, or deceit if the victim is mentally incompetent 
or younger than sixteen years and the detention or moving is 
accomplished without the effective consent of the victim's 
custodial parent, guardian, or person acting in loco parentis 
to the victim. 
(3) Aggravated kidnaping is a felony of the first degree 
punishable by a term which is a minimum mandatory term of 
imprisonment of 5, 10, or 15 years and which may be for life. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-6-302 - Aggravated Robbery 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course 
of committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as 
defined in Section 76-1-601; or 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered 
to be "in the course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in 
an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in the 
immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery. 
Utah Rules of Evidence; Rule 801(d)2 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not 
hearsay if: 
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered 
against a party and is (A) the party's own statement, in 
either an individual or a representative capacity, or (B) a 
statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or 
belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized 
by the party to make a statement concerning the subject, or 
(D) a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a 
matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made 
during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement 
by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in 
furtherance of the conspiracy. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a guilty verdict after a non-jury trial 
before the Honorable Michael J. Glasmann on the 26th day of July, 
1995. The Appellant was convicted of one count of aggravated 
robbery in violation of U.C.A. § 76-6-302 (1953, as amended); and 
one count of aggravated kidnaping in violation of U.C.A. § 76-5-302 
(1953, as amended). 
The Appellant and a Co-Defendant, James Robinson (hereinafter 
"Bo"), were charged with Aggravated Robbery and Aggravated 
Kidnapping in the Second Circuit Court of Weber County. Bo later 
pled guilty to amended charges of robbery and kidnapping. The 
Appellant's case went to trial and he was convicted as charged. 
During the course of the Appellant's trial, the State 
attempted to offer testimony regarding actions and statements made 
by "Bo", the co-defendant, during the events that led to the 
charges against the Appellant. The Appellant's trial attorney 
properly objected to the testimony on the grounds that the offered 
testimony was hearsay. 
The trial court allowed the statements to be proffered and 
reserved a ruling on the merits of the objections until the State 
had presented its case. At the conclusion of the State's case, the 
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statements were admitted as "non-hearsay under Rule 801( (d) (2) (E) of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
The Appellant now appeals on the basis that the statements 
should have been excluded as hearsay evidence because there was 
insufficient evidence, beyond the statements themselves, to prove 
that a criminal conspiracy existed between the Appellant and the 
co-Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant and a co-defendant, James Robinson, were charged 
with Aggravated Kidnapping and Aggravated Robbery. (R. 4) Prior 
to the trial on the matter, "Bo" accepted a plea negotiation, 
wherein he pled guilty to reduced charges of kidnapping and 
robbery. The Appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right 
to a jury trial, and proceeded to trial before Judge Michael 
Glasmann. (R. 8-9) 
At the onset of the trial, the State called Audrey Jenkins to 
testify. During the testimony of Ms. Jenkins, the State elicited 
statements made by Bo during the commission of the crime in an 
attempt to implicate the Defendant in the crime. Specifically that 
Bo said, "I want your money", (R. 27) "I know you have got some 
money" (R. 31), "I am not leaving until you give me some money", 
(R. 33) "You are going to go. Get your ass out in the car right 
now". (R. 35) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court committed reversible error in admitting the 
statements of the co-defendant against the Appellant. In order for 
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a statement to be considered non-hearsay, it must meet one of the 
exception's outlined in Rule 801 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The 
trial court erroneously accepted the statements of the co-defendant 
as non-hearsay statements by a co-conspirator under Rule 
801(d)(2)(E). 
Although the State need not actually charge conspiracy in 
order to admit statements of a co-conspirator, the trial court must 
find by a preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy existed. 
In the case at bar, there was insufficient evidence, independent of 
the statements, to prove that a criminal conspiracy existed. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR WHEN IT ALLOWED HEARSAY STATEMENTS MADE 
BY A CO-CONSPIRATOR, UNDER THE CO-CONSPIRACY 
EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE, INTO THE 
APPELLANT'S TRIAL WITHOUT SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHING 
THAT A CONSPIRACY EXISTED 
The Trial court committed reversible error when it allowed 
statements of the co-defendant to be introduced as evidence in the 
case against the Appellant. Rule 801(d)(2)(E) defines those 
statements that may be admitted as non-hearsay statements made by 
a co-conspirator. Rule 801(d)(2)(E) states: 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not 
hearsay if: 
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered 
against a party and is (A) the party's own statement, in 
either an individual or a representative capacity, or (B) a 
statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or 
belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized 
by the party to make a statement concerning the subject, or 
(D) a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a 
matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made 
during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement 
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by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in 
furtherance of the conspiracy. 
The Supreme Court of Utah examined this rule in the case of 
State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 31 Utah Adv. Rep. 31 (1986). In Gray 
the Supreme Court adopted the view that "the criminal venture and 
the defendant's participation therein must be established by a 
preponderance of the evidence," and that "a conspirator's statement 
may be provisionally admitted, subject to eventual independent 
proof of the criminal venture and the defendant's participation 
therein". (citations omitted). 
Although a charge of conspiracy need not be charged against 
the Defendant to enter a co-conspirator's statement under Rule 
801(d)(2)(E), the court must find, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that a conspiracy existed. Therefore, this Court must 
first examine the statute that governs the crime of Conspiracy 
found in U.C.A. § 76-4-20 (1953 as amended). That section states: 
For purposes of this part a person is guilty of 
conspiracy when he, intending that conduct constituting 
a crime be performed, agrees with one or more persons to 
engage in or cause the performance of such conduct and 
any one of them commits an overt act in pursuance of the 
conspiracy, except where the offense is a capital 
offense, a felony against the person, arson, burglary, or 
robbery, the overt act is not required for the commission 
of conspiracy, (emphasis added) 
In considering a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, the 
Utah Court of Appeals reviews evidence and all inferences which may 
reasonably be drawn from it in a light most favorable to the 
verdict, and reverses convictions for insufficient evidence only 
when the evidence so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained 
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a reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed the crime of which 
he was convicted. State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1992) 
Even looking at the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
Judge's decision, there was insufficient evidence presented by the 
State for the trial court to find by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the Appellant agreed with the co-defendant to engage 
or cause the performance of conduct constituting Aggravated Robbery 
and Aggravated Kidnapping. 
Absent the statements of the co-defendant, the only evidence 
that was submitted to the trial court regarding the Appellant's 
participation in the criminal venture was that he was present at 
the time the co-defendant threatened the victim, that he drove the 
co-defendant, the victim and another individual to a phone booth 
for the victim to make a phone call, that he looked through the 
victim's jacket and found no money in it, that he hit the victim on 
at least one occasion when the victim started fighting with the co-
defendant and that he drove the victim to Layton to get money. 
These facts, in and of themselves, do not constitute enough 
evidence for a Court to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that a criminal conspiracy existed. In order to find that a 
conspiracy existed, the trial court must find that the Appellant 
intended conduct constituting an element of the underlying crime 
and that he agreed with the co-defendant to engage or cause the 
performance of such conduct. There is no independent evidence that 
the Appellant had any criminal intent to commit aggravated robbery 
or aggravated kidnaping.. 
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Taking the evidence, absent the statements of Bo, in a light 
most favorable to the verdict, there is still insufficient evidence 
to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a criminal 
conspiracy existed. 
The two primary witnesses for the state were Audrey Jenkins 
and the victim, Etie Kabwasa. Ms. Jenkins testified that the 
Appellant was with Bo when Bo entered her apartment. That Bo had 
a knife, and that she wanted to leave but the Appellant told her 
not to leave. She also testified that the Appellant did not join 
into the fight between Bo and the victim, Etie, until after they 
started to "scuffle", and the Appellant drove all of the parties to 
the Red Duck Mini Mall in order for the victim to make a phone call 
to try to obtain money for Bo. 
Ms. Jenkins testified that the Appellant did not have a weapon 
and that he did not demand any money from the victim. In fact, the 
statements by the co-defendant admitted against the Appellant 
implicated the co-defendant's intent, not the Appellants. The 
following statements were admitted: "I want your money", (R. 27) 
"X know you have got some money" (R. 31), nI am not leaving until 
you give me some money", (R. 33) "You are going to go. Get your 
ass out in the car right now". (R. 35) 
Both the victim and Ms. Jenkins testified that the Appellant 
was unarmed, made no threats or requests for money, and was not 
even present when the alleged kidnapping of Audrey took place. 
When you take these limited facts in light with the admission 
by the victim that the Appellant had taken him to Layton on a 
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previous occasion to get money, that the Appellant had no weapons 
at the time of the occurrence complained of, and the fact that the 
co-defendant was the one who was threatening the victim, absent the 
co-defendant's statements, there is no independent evidence that 
the Appellant was involved in anything related to the aggravated 
kidnapping or the aggravated robbery. Both crimes require a show 
of force. 
The Appellant never made any threatening statements or 
gestures toward the victim. Only the co-defendant made the threats 
and he professed each demand and threat with the pronoun "I". Not 
once did the co-defendant even involve the Appellant in the 
commission or furtherance of the Robbery and Kidnapping. Without 
the Co-defendant's statements, there was no independent evidence of 
the appellants involvement in "conspiracy". 
CONCLUSION 
In looking at the facts of this case, it is clear that the 
statements made by the co-defendant should have been excluded from 
the Appellant's trial as hearsay. There was no conspiracy and 
therefore, the trial court erroneously applied Rule 801(d)(2)(E). 
The appellant's conviction must be reversed for he was denied his 
right to confrontation of primary witness against him. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this uO day o£-January, 1996. 
Kent E. Snider-
Attorney for Appellant 
^ 
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DATED this ^ ^ day of January, 1996. 
Kent E. Snider 
Attorney for Appellant 
11 
A D D E N D U M 
MR. ROBINSON: Yes. 
THE COURT: And, Mr. Butler, is your date of birth 
January the 16th, 1946? 
MR. BUTLER: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Do each of you understand 
what you have been charged with? 
MR. ROBINSON: Yes. 
8
 || MR. BUTLER: Yes. 
THE COURT: And your attorney has already indicated 
that you have been provided with copies of the Informations 
that were just read to you 
9 
10 
11 
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 || MR. GRAVIS: Yes 
13
 " MR. BUTLER: Just got them, yes 
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THE COURT: All right. I will ask you then, Mr. 
Robinson, as to the charge of Count 1, a first degree felony 
aggravated robbery, how do you plead? 
MR. ROBINSON: Not guilty. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Butler, as to that same 
charge first degree felony aggravated robbery, how do you 
plead? 
MR. BUTLER: Not guilty. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Robinson, as to Count 2 
where you are charged with a first degree felony aggravated 
kidnapping, how do you plead? 
MR. ROBINSON: Not guilty. 
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I haven't personally talked with him. 
THE COURT: Are you willing to represent at this 
-time_ that the State has no objection to the waiver of a Jury? 
MR. SAUNDERS: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Butler, you have a 
constitutional right to a trial by Jury, you understand that? 
MR. BUTLER: Yes, I do, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. If you had a trial with a 
Jury, we would end up with an eight person or eight member 
Jury that would hear this case. The Court would see to it 
that, to the best of the Court's abilities, that those Jurors 
that were selected would not know anything about the case and 
would not have any bias one way or the other in favor of the 
State or in favor of you, or against either party. 
It would take in a criminal case a unanimous verdict for 
a guilty verdict to be returned in the case. That means that 
all and each of those eight jurors would have to find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that you were guilty before a guilty verdict 
could be rendered. Do you understand that? 
MR. BUTLER: Yes, I do, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that if you waive your 
right to a Jury then that the matter will be tried to me. And 
that as an individual I will hear the evidence. And like the 
Jury I would have to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
State had proven its case before you would be found guilty. 
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But you would just have one person, me, as the Judge, making 
that decision, as opposed to an eight member Jury. You 
understand that? 
MR. BUTLER: Yes, I do, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Anything else the State or 
the defense wants me to cover concerning the waiver? 
MR. GRAVIS: Just that as I stated, it was your 
decision to waive the Jury, correct? 
MR. BUTLER: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. What you are suggesting 
there is you didn't suggest that to him, but he approached you| 
with it? 
MR. GRAVIS: He approached me with it. Is that 
correct? 
MR. BUTLER: Yes, I did. 
THE COURT: All right. With your understanding that] 
you have that constitutional right, and the effect that that 
would have on your case, do you want to go ahead and waive the| 
Jury at this time? 
MR. BUTLER: Yes I do, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. The Court is going to allow 
you to do that. The matter will be tried non-jury then on the| 
27th of July on Thursday. And that will start at 9:30 in the 
morning. 
MR. GRAVIS: Thank you, your Honor. 
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MR. GRAVIS: Objection, hearsay. 
MR. DAROCZI: Well, your Honor, this i s — 
MR. GRAVIS: Statement by a co-defendant. He is not) 
on trial. Mr. Butler is on trial. Anything Mr. Robinson 
says is hearsay. It is not admissible. It is not admissible 
against Mr. Butler. 
MR. DAROCZI: Your Honor, the Rule 801 of the 
evidence code specifically address that, statement by co-
conspirator. And I am offering it under that section. 
MR. GRAVIS: Mr. Butler is not charged with 
conspiracy. I agree that statements by a co-conspirators are 
admissible to prove the conspiracy. He is not charged with 
conspiracy. There is no charge of conspiracy here. And it isl 
only admissible to prove the conspiracy. In fact the case law) 
also holds that if the Court dismisses the charge of 
conspiracy in a case with other charges pending, the Court is 
then to instruct the Jury to disregard the hearsay testimony 
of the co-defendant as inadmissible. 
MR. DAROCZI: As a matter of fact, your Honor, the 
cases in the—the three cases that are referred to in the 
footnotes to rule 801 refer to three cases where the 
conspirator's statements, similar statements were admitted. 
In none of the three cases had conspiracy been charged. But 
the Court allowed the statements by co-conspirators. They 
were drug cases. Two of them were drug cases wherein the co-
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defendant's statement had been admitted as a co-conspirator's 
statement under the rule. And neither is there authority for 
the position that counsel takes that a conspiracy in fact has 
to be charged for co-conspirator's statements to come in. As 
a matter of fact, I have authority to the effect that it does 
not have to be charged. 
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, I haven't researched it for] 
quite sometime, but Mr. Daroczi and I tried a conspiracy case 
four or five years ago where the conspiracy was dismissed at 
the end of the prosecution case and requested that specific 
instruction. So I know there is a case, Utah case law on that! 
issue. 
THE COURT: Either of you consider briefing this 
before you came in? 
MR. GRAVIS: I had no—he never filed a motion for—! 
in limine to allow this. And it is hearsay. And it is my 
position that it is inadmissible. 
MR. DAROCZI: Your Honor, counsel has been lying in 
wait here. He has had the reports, and he knows exactly what 
the State's case is about. 
THE COURT: Well, without the attack back and forth, 
I don't have a brief from either one of you. Hold on just a 
minute, I will take a look at this rule. 
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, may I make one further 
statement? I had filed a Motion to Sever based upon the 
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Bruton decision, a statements made by the co-defendant being 
admissible, not admissible against my client. So Mr. Daroczi 
was on notice that I intended t o — 
THE COURT: The footnote to the rule makes reference] 
to State vs. Gray. It says to utilize the co-conspirator 
exception the State must introduce evidence independent and 
exclusive of the conspirator's hearsay statements themselves 
and establish by a preponderance of the evidence the existence) 
of a criminal joint venture and the Defendant's participation 
therein. Independent evidence of the Defendant's membership 
in the criminal venture is almost required. I don't believe l| 
have that at this point. 
MR. DAROCZI: If the Court will take this testimony 
subject to that, we certainly—our position is that— 
THE COURT: I am not very comfortable in doing that. 
I am the trier of the fact here. I am going to sustain the 
objection at this point. 
MR. DAROCZI: Your Honor, we cannot proceed then 
further unless the Court takes it. I have authority to the 
effect that the Court can consider that statement and then 
analyze it, take the testimony subject to that requirement. 
Because otherwise the Court cannot hear the facts of this 
case. The statements—most of the statements are made by Bo 
Robinson. Most of the threats. As a matter of fact, most of 
the violence is committed by Bo Robinson against the victim. 
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And our secondary position is that the Defendant is 
secondarily aiding and abetting, aiding and abetting in a 
crime. So by virtue of that, if the Court excludes the 
statements, the evidence will not—the trier of the facts 
cannot hear a full story. 
THE COURT: I think what we should do, let me ask a 
question. And let's note for the record here that there is 
another matter that the Court has had pending this morning. 
Is the D'Hulst matter ready to go forward? 
What we are going to do is take a recess in the criminal 
action. Counsel, I expect you to go during the recess and 
pull up your case authority. We will spend a few minutes in 
my Chambers determining where we are. 
You may step down, ma1am. If you will stay close, you 
will be subject to being recalled back to the stand. Okay? 
The criminal matter is in recess. We will go to the case 
of D'Hulst vs. DfHulst at this time. 
(Butler case recessed.) 
THE COURT: Let our record show that we are back in 
session. The parties are present with counsel. When we last 
broke, the Court broke to handle another matter that was 
pending. And thatfs been taken care of. But the Court also 
asked counsel to look into this question that was on the 
record previously that had to do with whether this testimony 
of statements made by Mr. Robinson would be admissible in this 
25 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
case. 
And at this point the Court is going to allow the 
statements in. And they will be allowed in provisionally, 
subject to the State meeting the test for the admissibility of 
those statements. And that will be determined by the Court 
after the testimony is received. 
MR. DAROCZI: If I may add one thing. The State is 
also offering it as non-hearsay. As non-hearsay in that it is 
not offered for the truth of the matter asserted therein, but 
as an independent—as statements having independent 
significance. So with that we are ready to proceed. 
MR. GRAVIS: And we are objecting on both grounds. 
We agree the Court can provisionally hear the testimony of a 
co-conspirator. But if the conspiracy is not proven, the 
statements would be disregarded. 
As far as the other argument the State has made, he just 
brought that up in Chambers, I have not had time to research 
it. But we are objecting that the statements would still be 
hearsay. 
THE COURT: All right. We have noted those 
objections. Go ahead with your questions. 
Ma'am, you understand you are still under oath? 
A Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Q Audrey, you were telling us that Bo, James Robinson, 
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had come in. You saw him there, and he said something, is 
that correct? 
A Correct. 
Q What was it? 
A He said Etie, I want your money. 
Q I want y o u r — 
A Money. 
Q I want your money. All right. Continue from that 
point on. 
A He said give me your money. 
THE COURT: And he said a name before he said that? 
A Etie. 
Q Etie. And who was he speaking to? 
A Etie Kabwasa. 
Q This gentleman here? 
A Correct. 
Q Okay. Continue with what was said. What did Etie 
say or do? 
A Etie said I donft have any money. And Bo said I 
know you do because somebody saw you down at the Legion and 
said you were spending money. 
Q The Legion? 
A The American Legion, Post 266 on 27th and Wall. 
Q Do you know if Etie frequents that, or had 
frequented it? 
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A Occasionally, but not frequently, 
Q All right, go ahead. So James Robinson said I know 
you do and so forth, is that correct? 
A Correct. 
Q All right. Then continue with the conversation. 
Then what? 
A So he told him he didn't have any money. And Bo 
insisted that he did have money. And at this time Lydia 
noticed that—well, we all were sitting on the floor. And so 
Lydia went to go stand up because she didnft want any part of 
it, because when Bo walked into the room he had a knife in his 
hand and opened it. It was like a pocket knife. And he had 
it opened in his hand. So the intent— 
MR. GRAVIS: Objection, your Honor, that calls for 
speculation about intent. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q Tell us what Lydia did. 
THE COURT: You canft tell us about her intent. 
Describe what happened. 
Q Maybe I can ask it in a different way. What about— 
what about Franklin Butler? You have said that Bo Robinson, 
James Robinson, entered. 
A Frank walked in right behind Bo. It might have 
taken him five or ten seconds longer to get up the stairs and 
into the room. 
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Q All right. So when the conversation occurred about 
the money, was Franklin Butler present? 
A Correct. 
Q All right. And what was—was he armed in any way? 
A Not—no. 
Q No, okay. And—but he was in the same room? 
A Yes. 
Q All right. And at this point—up to this moment 
here, had he said anything, referring to Franklin Butler? 
A Up until the moment when they came in the room? 
Q No, to the moment where there is a discussion that I 
know you do because somebody had seen you at the Legion, had 
Franklin Butler said anything at that point? 
A Yes. 
Q What, if anything? 
A He told Lydia she could go ahead and leave, but told 
me I couldn't leave the room. 
Q You are referring to Lydia? 
A Lydia is my neighbor. 
Q What led up to that, when Franklin Butler said Lydia 
could leave and you couldn't? 
A Our kids was spending the night at Lydiafs house. 
Lydia said she wanted to go home, she had kids there and 
didn't want to be involved in it, in what was happening in the 
room. So he let her out of the room, and she left out of the 
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room. 
Q Did you intend to go with her? 
A I had good intentions on going with her, but Frank 
told me I couldn't leave the room. He slammed the door as 
Lydia left out of the room. 
Q He slammed the door? 
A Yes. 
Q And what happened next? 
A The next thing I know, Bo is hitting Frank—I mean 
Bo is hitting Etie. 
Q How? 
A I can't—I am not positively sure, but I know it was 
with his hand. Whether it was closed or open fist, I cannot 
say. 
Q And is Etie standing up or sitting down still, or 
what's the position? 
A The first time he got hit, he got hit sitting down. 
And he kind of—it is like a reflex of like got up hurriedly. 
Q That's the word, go ahead. 
A And the next thing I know, they were—he was hitting 
him again. And I was trying to get out of the room. 
Q All right. And why didn't you get out of the room? 
A Because Frank told me I couldn't leave the room. 
Q What happened next? 
A So they commenced arguing. 
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Q Relate that* 
A They continued arguing. 
Q Tell us what the argument was, instead of it was 
just an argument. 
A Bo said I know you have got some money, that's why 
we came over here because I knew you had some money. And Etie) 
said I don't have any money. Etie said we will go get m y — 
Etie says I don't have any money to give you. And then him 
and Bo was arguing. He told me, he said Audrey, go downstairs] 
and get my jacket. I have some money in my jacket. So Frank 
opened the door. I went out of the room. I went downstairs 
and got his jacket. I came— 
Q He opened he room for you? 
A He opened the door, correct. 
Q Okay. 
A And when I came back upstairs, I walked back in the 
room. 
Q Did you bring the jacket up? 
A Yes, I did. I gave it to Frank. 
Q Gave it to Frank? 
A Yes. 
Q Then what happened? What was done with the jacket? 
A Frank looked through the jacket and said there was 
no money in the jacket. I don't know what was in the jacket. 
THE COURT: Who looked in the jacket? 
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A Frank looked in the jacket, 
Q And said there was no money in it? 
A He said he didn't find any money in the jacket 
Q All right. So what happened with the jacket? Was 
it put down? 
A I honestly am not sure. 
Q Okay. What happens next? 
A So Bo and Etie, they are tussling over in the 
corner. And Frank went to move away from the door. As he 
moved away, I went on out the door. And I went to Lydia's 
house. 
Q All right. So you are gone at this point? 
A I got out of the house the first opportunity I could] 
get. 
Q All right. So you went to Lydia!s house which as 
you said is in the adjacent apartment building. 
A Adjacent, yes, diagonally adjacent. 
Q And is that an apartment then too? 
A Correct. 
Q Then did you see any of the parties sometime 
thereafter? 
A Yes, I did. \ 
Q Tell us how that went. j 
A Lydia and I went—I went over to Lydia's house. We 
were sitting downstairs in the kitchen. And Bo knocked on the 
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door. So I opened the door. And Bo came downstairs to where 
we were. And in a few minutes, a few seconds or minutes 
later, I am not quite sure of the time between, Etie and Frank] 
walked into the house and came downstairs. A n d — 
Q Is the floor plan the same? 
A The floor plan, they are like a townhouse. 
Q All right. Continue please. 
A Etie said he wanted to talk to me. We went upstairs) 
to the bathroom and locked the door behind us. The next 
thing, Bo was knocking on the door. He knocked extremely 
hard. I felt as though it was open it or he would kick the 
door open. 
Q This is the bathroom door? 
A This is the bathroom door. 
Q Okay. Did you lock it? 
A We locked it upon going in. 
Q Okay. And so what happens next? 
A So Bo comes in and he kind of holds the door with 
one hand and sits on the sink. And he starts telling him you 
are going to get—you know, what are you going to do, because 
I am not leaving until you give me money. So, you know, Etie 
is trying to tell them that now he doesn't have any money to 
give him. And he said well, you had better find a way to get 
it. And Etie says well, I can't do anything unless I make a 
phone call. So he said—so he says well, okay, letfs go. 
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Let's go make a phone call. He said we can go right cross the) 
street and use the phone. 
So we are getting ready to go out the door. I went 
downstairs to tell Lydia what was going on. And at that time 
I walked out the door, I walked out of the house. They were 
in the street, and they were—Bo and Etie were fighting. 
Q Bo and Etie were fighting? 
A Bo and Etie were fighting. And as the fight 
continued, Frank came. I don't know, I don't recall if he was| 
sitting in his car. But he walked—I heard Etie yelling you 
better stop. There was a car coming up the street. I figured] 
one of my neighbors might have called the police, because it 
wasn't quiet, and it was really late. 
THE COURT: When you say fighting, are you talking 
about verbally fighting? 
A No, I mean physically fighting. 
Q Punches being thrown? 
A Punches being thrown. 
Q By each side? 
A Yes. 
Q All right. 
A And h e — I don't know at what point he pulled his 
knife out of his pocket again, but y o u — 
Q You are referring to who? 
A Bo. 
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Q Okay, 
A But you could tell that at different intervals that 
Etier=was trying to dodge a knife or something. And I don't 
know if Frank was in his car or standing on the side of the 
car as all of this was going on. But the next thing I know is 
he walked around his car and him and Bo were beating up Etie. 
They pinned him up next to the gray car that belonged to a 
neighbor across the street. It is always parked on the 
street. And they had him pinned up against the car. And they 
were just giving him blow after blow after blow. 
Q Okay. Continue. 
A Okay. And so I ran back in the house, you know, 
because I thought the police were coming up the street. I 
didn't know. So the next thing I know, Bo is knocking on the 
door and telling me come on. I says Bo, I don't want to go. 
And he says well, you are going to go. Get your ass out in 
the car right now. 
As I was coming out of the house to get in the car, the 
back door was opened. He said get in that door right there 
that's opened. And I set in the back. Etie set up front. 
Frank drove and Bo set behind the driver. 
Q How about Etie. 
A Etie was in the front passenger seat. 
Q Okay. Continue. 
A So as we were driving up the street I suggested— 
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Q Is it a post or a board? 
A It is a post. 
Q Okay, Continue. 
A And he walked towards Etie with it. And there is a 
cement barrier dividing the parking lot, the grass and the 
sidewalk. And Etie kind of like tripped over it. But prior 
to that, for some reason I believe that they were arguing. 
They were punching him still. 
Q They? 
A Because I was trying to talk. I can't—I could hear] 
it, but I was trying to talk to Harry on the phone. 
12
 [I Q All right 
13
 " A When I looked around he drew back and hit him with 
14 
this post. 
Q When you say he, you will have to tell us who you 
are referring to. 
A Frank did. 
Q Frank did. So it was Frank that had the post? 
A Yes. 
Q And you say he drew back and he did what with the 
post? 
A He hit Etie. Etie tripped over the barrier there. 
As he went to roll over, the next thing you know, Frank hit 
him. He only hit him once, but he hit him hard. 
Q What part of the body? 
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A The upper part of his body. 
Q And what was—what was the result of that, as far as| 
Etie was concerned? 
A I was still on the phone. But he wasn't moving. 
And I really thought that he was unconscious. But by the end 
of the phone call, they helped him up and they helped him back] 
into the car. 
Q Okay, all right. So you hung up, eventually 
finished the conversation. Was there an agreement between you] 
and Frank? 
A There wasn't an agreement. 
Q I mean what w a s — w h a t — 
A The agreement, they wanted Harry to come to Ogden. 
But Harry said he wasn't going to do that. 
Q All right. 
A And I kept telling him the only way you are going to 
get your money is take us out there, or you are not going to 
get anything. Frank didn't want to drive out to Layton. He 
said he is not a taxi. 
Q You mean Harry? 
A No, Frank. 
Q Frank didn't want to drive to Layton? 
A No. 
Q Okay. 
A Realizing that was the only way he was going to get 
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